Ten of the top commercial Android antivirus software products were
beaten by common malware obfuscation methods, according to new
research.
Researchers from Northwestern University and North Carolina State
University for one year tested popular mobile AV apps for Android
on their ability to detect malware that uses evasion techniques,
such as changing up the code or morphing a malware sample.
Polymorphism can be as simple as changing the order of the code and
data files or just renaming the file, or as complex as changing the
appearance of the code but not its behavior.
The researchers — Yan Chen and Vaibhav Rastogi of
Northwestern and Xuxian Jiang of NC State — used a homegrown
prototype malware obfuscation /transformation tool called
DroidChameleon in their experiment, which ran from February 2012
until February 2013. The tool automatically transformed known
Android malware families, including DroidDream, Geinimi,
Fakeplayer, Bserv, BaseBridge, and Plankton, to test the mettle of
the AV programs.
The bad news: The researchers were able to cheat all of the AV
products they tested, including AVG Antivirus, Symantec Norton
Mobile Security, Lookout Mobile Security, ESET Mobile Security, Dr.
Web AntiVirus Light, Kaspersky Mobile Security, Trend Micro
Security Personal Ed, ESTSoft ALYac Android, Zoner Antivirus Free,
and Webroot Security Antivirus.
The good news is that the tools appear to be getting better at
detecting malware that uses basic transformation/obfuscation
techniques, such as repacking or reassembling the malware, via
unzip or rezip, for example. These methods don’t change the code,
just the packaging. In 2012, 45 percent of the AV signatures failed
to detect malware that used such basic transformation techniques,
but this year only 16 percent of them have missed “trivially”
transformed malware samples so far, the researchers say.
“There are some things that vendors could improve, and there also
are some fundamental problems with [their] resilience [against]
these [polymorphic malware] attacks, says Chen, associate professor
in electrical engineering and computer science at Northwestern. “We
have seen dramatic improvement for the past year” in detecting
malware with rudimentary transformation.
“The result that we have here certainly indicates improvement:
Anti-malware tools do not succumb as frequently to such trivial
transformations. However, this is far from good. As long as
anti-malware tools continue to use content-based signatures,
evading them is really easy,” Chen says.
Today’s mobile AV signatures are based on byte patterns in the
malware, and malware writers can easily evade AV tools by changing
those bytes, according to the researchers. Some 90 percent of the
malware signatures studied by the researchers don’t use static
analysis of the byte-level code. Dr. Web was the only AV product
employing static analysis, they say.
“The main problem with such signatures is that they are based on
patterns of bytes in the malware. These bytes can, however, easily
be changed without altering the functionality. Another way to say
this is there could be many differently written pieces of program
code that all do the same thing,” Yan says. AV technology must
evolve to semantics-based detection, which analyzes the
functionality in an app.
But at least one mobile vendor contends that the experiment by
Northwestern and NC State doesn’t reflect real-world threats.
“These recent test results are not representative of the current
threat landscape that Symantec customers would be exposed to. For
example, Norton Mobile Security protects against real-world threats
that are known to alter their code, and these threats were not used
in the test,” a Symantec spokesperson says. “Symantec constantly
researches potential future advancements in attacker strategies and
continually monitors the threat landscape, evaluating and evolving
our protection capabilities for our mobile products to protect
customers accordingly.”
Tim Wyatt, director of security engineering for Lookout, says the
research demonstrates the challenges of securing mobile devices
today, noting that the research focuses on the endpoint piece of
the puzzle.
“The testing performed by Northwestern/NC State confirms what we
already know: Detection of unknown and/or highly customized malware
is a challenge for traditional endpoint security. This challenge is
magnified by the constraints of mobile platforms,” Wyatt says.
“This study focused on the endpoint side of the problem, and we
believe that a comprehensive approach to addressing these
challenges combines presence on the endpoint with powerful back-end
analysis and continuous monitoring of endpoint health.”
Mobile malware, meanwhile, is skyrocketing: According to a
recent report by NQ Mobile, more than 65,000 mobile malware threats
were discovered in 2012, a 163 percent increase from the previous
year. And 95 percent of the malware was exploiting the Android
operating system, either via application repackaging, malicious
URLs, or SMS phishing a.k.a. SMiShing.
The malware boom resulted in some 32.8 million Androids getting
infected in 2012, a 200 percent increase from 2011.
NC State’s Jiang says mobile security is evolving, and it’s not
just an AV issue. “Users need to be cautious about what kind of app
they download. A centralized [and authorized] app store is one way
to mitigate this threat, [as is] static analysis,” he says.
“Malware mostly [comes] through app stores.”
Google’s Bouncer scanning of apps is a good step, he says, as well
as next-generation mobile security features, such as sandboxing.
Samsung, for example, has developed the KNOX partitioning feature
for sandboxing apps, which could help better lock down mobile
devices, Xuxian says.
But the “stock” Android OS does not allow AV products the
appropriate privileges to perform behavioral monitoring of code,
Chen notes. “Smartphone manufacturers can certainly add their own
features to secure mobile devices,” he says. “The highest impact
however, in my opinion, would be when Android, as developed by
Google, itself had these security features. Then, every Android
device, regardless of the vendor, would have such features. There
are steps being made in this direction: SELinux additions in
Android 4.2 are an example of this.”
The researchers say they hope their findings spur improvement in
mobile malware detection. Their goal wasn’t to call out the best AV
solutions, they say, and their research didn’t cover signature
database coverage or resource use on the phones, or SMS
spam-filtering or lost device functions. “Evaluating these
functionalities remains beyond the scope of this paper,” they wrote
in their “Evaluating Android Anti-malware Against Transformation
Attacks” paper, which is available here
(PDF) for download.
Mobile AV apps fail to detect disguised malware
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